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“Taking ‘Kony 2012′ Down A Notch,” Justice in Conflict blog, 7 March 2012

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“Taking ‘Kony 2012′ Down A Notch,” Justice in Conflict blog, 7 March 2012
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/03/07/taking-kony-2012-down-a-notch/

JRP is cited (below: “majority of Acholi people”) in reference to our December situational analysis on amnesty.

By Mark Kersten

As we speak, one of the most pervasive and successful human rights based viral campaigns in recent memory is underway. Invisible Children’s ‘Kony 2012‘ campaign has taken Twitter, Youtube, Facebook and every other mainstream social media refuge by storm. In many ways, it is quite impressive. But there’s one glaring problem: the campaign reflects neither the realities of northern Ugandan nor the attitudes of its people. In this context, this post examines the explicit and implicit claims made by the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign and tests them against the empirical record on the ground.

Before jumping into the fray, however, I should preface the post by noting that, in many ways, Invisible Children have done a fantastic job in advocating for the rights of northern Ugandans, highlighting the conflict and providing tangible benefits to victims and survivors of LRA brutality. Indeed, this post is not intended to take aim at Invisible Children as an organization but rather to debunk some of the myths its ‘Kony 2012′ campaign is propagating.

The Problem is Popularity? 

Kony 2012 is about making Joseph Kony, the leader of the notorious LRA, famous because, the line of reasoning goes, if everyone knew him, no one would be able to stand idly by as he waged his brutal campaign of terror against the people of East Africa.

I am actually stupefied that any analysis of the ‘LRA question’ results in the identification of the problem being that “Kony isn’t popular enough”. The reality is that few don’t know who Joseph Kony is in East Africa and the Great Lakes Region, making it all-too-apparent that this isn’t about them, their views or their experiences. But even more puzzling is that Joseph Kony is one of the best known alleged war criminals in the world – including in the United States. This is the case in large part because of the advocacy of Western NGOs, including Invisible Children and the Enough Project as well as the ICC arrest warrants issued against Kony and his senior command.

I would understand if this were the 1990s or even the early 2000s when the misery plaguing northern Uganda flew completely under the radar. I would understand if this campaign was about the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. But a campaign in 2012, premised on Joseph Kony not being famous enough is just folly.

'Kony 2012'

A poster from the ‘Kony 2012’ campaign. (Poster: Invisible Children)

Umm…what about northern Ugandans?

It is hard to respect any documentary on northern Uganda where a five year-old white boy features more prominently than any northern Ugandan victim or survivor. Incredibly, with the exception of the adolescent northern Ugandan victim, Jacob, the voices of northern Ugandans go almost completely unheard.

It isn’t hard to imagine why the views of northern Ugandans wouldn’t be considered: they don’t fit with the narrative produced and reproduced in the insulated echo chamber that produced the ‘Kony 2012′ film.

‘Kony 2012′, quite dubiously, avoids stepping into the ‘peace-justice’ question in northern Uganda precisely because it is a world of contesting and plural views, eloquently expressed by the northern Ugandans themselves. Some reports suggest that the majority of Acholi people continue to support the amnesty process whereby LRA combatants – including senior officials – return to the country in exchange for amnesty and entering a process of ‘traditional justice’. Many continue to support the Ugandan Amnesty law because of the reality that it is their own children who constitute the LRA. Once again, this issue is barely touched upon in the film. Yet the LRA poses a stark dilemma to the people of northern Uganda: it is now composed primarily of child soldiers, most of whom were abducted and forced to join the rebel ranks and commit atrocities. Labeling them “victims” or “perpetrators” becomes particularly problematic as they are often both.

Furthermore, the crisis in northern Uganda is not seen by its citizens as one that is the result of the LRA. Yes, you read that right. The conflict in the region is viewed as one wherein both the Government of Uganda and the LRA, as well as their regional supporters (primarily South Sudan and Khartoum, respectively) have perpetrated and benefited from nearly twenty-five years of systemic and structural violence and displacement. This pattern is what Chris Dolan has eloquently and persuasively termed ‘social torture‘ wherein both the Ugandan Government and the LRA’s treatment of the population has resulted in symptoms of collective torture and the blurring of the perpetrator-victim binary.

Kony and Egeland

Kony and his former second in command, Vincent Otti, with former UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland (Photo: New York Times)

The Solution?

Given Invisible Children’s problematic identification of the issue, it becomes impossible for them to come up with an appropriate vision of resolving the crisis.

Invisible Children is, perhaps rightly, proud that it put the ‘LRA question’ on the Obama administration’s agenda. In this context, last year’s announcement that the administration would send 100 military ‘advisors’ to Uganda was widely celebrated. But this triumphalism occludes key realities.

The sending of 100 troops was not, in any sense, an altruistic move by the administration. First, it went unreported that many of the troops were already in Uganda. Second, the announcement was, at least in part, a tit-for-tat response for the Government of Uganda’s military engagement in Somalia – where the US refuses to deploy troops. As Matt Brown of the Enough Project conceded:

“The U.S. doesn’t have to fight al-Qaida-linked Shabab in Somalia, so we help Uganda take care of their domestic security problems, freeing them up to fight a more dangerous – or a more pressing, perhaps – issue in Somalia.

It is clear that the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign sees the 100 US troop allotment as inadequate. Here they are right – 100 US troops is not the solution. But their own answer is highly problematic.

We know what the makers of “Kony 2012″ believe should happen but they won’t say it explicitly, except to say that Kony must be “stopped”.

Obama’s orders for his 100 troops – presumably supported by those behind ‘Kony 2012′ – is to “kill or capture” Joseph Kony. I don’t think it is a stretch to suggest that many of the same individuals who will form the legion of participants in ‘Kony 2012′ were on the streets celebrating the killing of Osama bin Laden. It thus likely holds that they bought into the belief, proffered by Obama himself, that bin Laden’s killing amounted to justice and if you didn’t agree, you should get your head checked.

The solution then, is something similar: an American-led intervention into at least four countries where the LRA is or has been active (Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic and South Sudan) to hunt down Kony. Capturing him, after all, is secondary to “stopping” him.

The idea of “stopping Kony”, of course plays into the narrative created by the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign where what actually happens to Kony and the LRA is irrelevant. The unspecific aim of “stopping” him is sufficient. Who, after all, doesn’t want Kony “stopped”? But then what? If Kony is killed or captured, then what? What happens to the other members of the LRA? ‘Kony 2012′ offers no answers here.

In this context, it is worthwhile remembering that massive regional military solutions (Operations Iron Fist and Lightning Thunder most recently), with support from the US, have thus far failed to dismantle or “stop” the LRA. These failures have created serious and legitimate doubts that the ‘LRA question’ is one that can be resolved by military means.

Incredibly, there is no mention in the film or the campaign that northern Ugandans are currently enjoying the longest period of peace since the conflict began in 1986. Virtually every single northern Ugandan I spoke to during my own field research believes that there is peace in the region. While sporadic violence continues, particularly as a result of bitter land disputes, there have been no LRA attacks in years. In the mid 2000s, the ‘LRA problem’ was exported out of Uganda. The LRA is currently residing in the DRC, CAR, and perhaps parts of South Sudan and even Darfur. Today, land issues and the recent Walk to Work crisis are higher on the agenda than the LRA in northern Uganda.

Lastly, killing Kony cannot resolve the actual sources of the crisis which are far more structural than superficial (to put it lightly) analyses like ‘Kony 2012′ would like to admit. As respected scholars of northern Uganda, Mareike Schomerus, Tim Allen, and Koen Vlassenroot, recently argued,

“Until the underlying problem — the region’s poor governance — is adequately dealt with, there will be no sustainable peace.”

Kony (left) with Otti. (Photo: AFP)

The Need for a Sober Second Thought

In the end, ‘Kony 2012′ falls prey to the obfuscating, simplified and wildly erroneous narrative of a legitimate, terror-fighting, innocent partner of the West (the Government of Uganda) seeking to eliminate a band of lunatic, child-thieving, machine-gun wielding mystics (the LRA). The main beneficiary of this narrative is, once again, the Ugandan Government of Yoweri Museveni, whose legitimacy is bolstered and – if the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign is ‘successful’ – will receive more military funding and support from the US.

Of course, as a viral campaign launched through social media, ‘Kony 2012′ is impressive, if not unprecedented. It will, undoubtedly, mobilize and morph a horde of sincere American youths into proxy war criminal hunters. It will further succeed in increasing the ‘popularity’ of Joseph Kony and the LRA in the United States. But it will do so for many of – if not all – the wrong reasons.

I remember when I was in grade school and a teacher told the students that it was actually difficult to fail. “You have to try to fail,” he said. If ‘Kony 2012′ is to be judged by its reflection of the realities on the ground in northern Uganda and how it measures up against the empirical record, the makers of Kony 2012 tried – and succeeded.

——————————

UPDATE: I’ve now published a response to the main criticisms that this post has inspired. See here: Taking ‘Kony2012′ Down a Notch – Responding to Criticism.

Check out this excellent account by Daniel Solomon over at his blog, Securing Rights.

Also, big thanks to my friend and colleague, Paul Kirby, for his insightful comments on a draft of this post.

“The Kwoyelo Trial: A Final(?) Roundup,” Justice in Conflict, 13 February 2012

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Note: JRP’s photo from the Kwoyelo trial opening was featured in this post.

“The Kwoyelo Trial: A Final(?) Roundup,” Justice in Conflict, 13 February 2012
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/02/13/the-kwoyelo-trial-a-final-roundup/

By Patrick Wegner

Last summer Justice in Conflict regularly reported on the trial of former LRA Commander Thomas Kwoyelo. After being arrested by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2009, the Ugandan Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) decided to charge Kwoyelo with war crimes under the Geneva Conventions and with crimes under national law.

The trial received considerable national and international attention as it was the first case of the newly created International Crimes Division (ICD) of the Ugandan High Court. The ICD had been founded in reaction to questions of accountability that arose during the Juba peace talks between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the LRA. Meanwhile the Ugandan Parliament has passed the International Criminal Court (ICC) Act, which allows the ICD to prosecute Rome Statute crimes on the domestic level.

In a nutshell, the ICD referred the Kwoyelo case to the Constitutional Court when Kwoyelo’s defence lawyers protested that Kwoyelo had been denied amnesty under the Amnesty Act. In their view, this constituted a violation of equal treatment under the Ugandan Constitution. The Constitutional Court decided in late September 2011 that Kwoyelo should be eligible for amnesty and ordered the ICD to cease the case against him.

Even though the case was stopped, Kwoyelo remained in detention. He then decided to sue the GoU for illegal detention and petitioned the Ugandan High Court for amnesty on 23rd of November 2011. The High Court indeed ruled that Thomas Kwoyelo should be given amnesty and be set free. The Department of Public Prosecutions and the Amnesty Commission are the two competent institutions in this case and decided to meet to consult the Kwoyelo case after the High Court ruling. In early February the Department of Public Prosecutions again denied amnesty to Thomas Kwoyelo, citing that there can be no amnesty for charges of war crimes. Thomas Kwoyelo thus remains imprisoned in Luzira Prison in Kampala to date.

The judges of the ICD in charge of the Kwoyelo case (Justice and Reconciliation Project)

There are several conclusions that can be drawn out of the way the first domestic war crimes trial in Uganda developed. First and foremost, the ongoing back and forth concerning Thomas Kwoyelo’s amnesty again underlines that Uganda is at the crossroads with transitional justice. The actions of the DPP hint at a re-orientation towards more accountability and less amnesty in the future. The DPP has made that clear by repeatedly denying amnesty to Kwoyelo, despite court orders, and by announcing that it has prepared additional cases against former LRA rebels that it will pursue should Kwoyelo be found guilty. As far as I am aware there is no explicit government position on how amnesty and prosecution should relate to each other in the future, and the lack of clarity might well spark fears and unrest among LRA returnees as I have described in a piece last summer.

Secondly, the first case of the ICD has arguably also shown that demands for more positive complementarity, meaning more domestic trials, in ICC cases should be voiced more carefully. Creating institutions that are legally able to try ICC cases in the situation countries is an important goal. I have frequently argued for more positive complementarity at the ICC myself.

Yet just creating these institutions is not enough. One has to ensure that appropriate laws are in place and that the court is qualified to deal with international war crimes cases. There are several examples of how things went wrong in this context at the ICD. In general the GoU was seemingly in a hurry to demonstrate that the ICD was up and running by presenting a first case and preferably a conviction. Some sources have accused the GoU of presenting the ICD with a pre-determined budget and timeline for a ruling in the Kwoyelo case.

Thomas Kwoyelo before the ICD in Gulu

It is important to acknowledge that the ICD is doing something that has never been done anywhere else in Africa. Creating a High Court Division competent of ruling on Rome Statute Crimes is a novel development. The judges include well qualified experts with experience in international criminal law and most of them have attended best-practice training at the ICC in The Hague according to the ICD Registry.

Despite the ICD Project being generally commendable, there are some other problems that emerged from the rushed effort to try a first case at the ICD as quickly as possible. The case before the ICD showed that witness protection laws in Uganda are inadequate. The judges are only able to order ad-hoc measures to protect witnesses if there are clear signs for danger. The Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) of the Ugandan Government is working on laws to alleviate this problem, but results are not expected before mid-2012.

Last, but not least, the ICD is so far working with guiding principles instead of full rules of procedure. The guiding principles are open for best practice approaches from other cases of international criminal law, which makes them highly flexible. Yet, a lack of full rules of procedures may lead to problems of fair trial or delays in some cases. All in all the Kwoyelo trial has proven that the ICD is a politically independent institution that is to be taken seriously. Still, it has also shown the remaining weaknesses in the systems and has highlighted the danger of cases becoming politicized. The fact that Kwoyelo is still in jail despite numerous court rulings seems to be an indicator that the DPP was trying to make a political point by indicting Kwoyelo.

Community Theatre for Justice and Reconciliation, Soul Beat Africa, 27 Jan 2012

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Community Theatre for Justice and Reconciliation, Soul Beat Africa, 27 Jan 2012
http://www.comminit.com/edutain-africa/content/theatre-justice-and-reconciliation

As part of community mobilisation activities, the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) is using community theatre performances as a tool for survivors of the Ugandan conflict to advocate for issues affecting them. The dramas are created by community members, and videos made of the performances to highlight key issues.

Communication Strategies:
The pilot community theatre programme was implemented through JRP’s Community Mobilisation department. The mobilisation department works to engage communities in identifying what needs to be done to promote justice and reconciliation. This includes providing information and updates on transitional justice processes and building capacity and opportunities for victims’ involvement in such processes.

JRP has used community theatre in various communities. For example, on September 16 2011, JRP facilitated survivors and families of those killed in Uganda’s 1989 Mukura massacre to hold a community performance on transitional justice issues. The performance was part of JRP’s ongoing engagement with the Mukura Memorial Development Initiative (MUMEDI) and the Kumi Network of Development Organizations (KUNEDO) and was designed to generate discussion among the community on how to best seek justice and reconciliation after the conflict in the area. The drama’s script and theme was entirely drafted by the actors (see video below). The video shows how the drama highlights key scenes and recommendations by survivors of the 1989 Mukura massacre. In the performance, they call for traditional reconciliation with the President of Uganda.

In another community on September 21, JRP and the MAYANK Development Association organised celebrations for the annual International Day of Peace 2011 in Yumbe district, West Nile sub-region. Survivors of the UNRF II conflict presented a drama that highlighted the cause and rise of the UNRF II and the resolution of the conflict through the Yumbe Peace Accord in 2002. Other similar performances have been facilitated in Lukodi and Abia.

Development Issues: Post Conflict, Peace

Key Points:
Established in 2005, The Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) in Gulu, northern Uganda, works for transitional justice in Uganda by seeking to understand and explain the interests, needs, concerns, and views of communities affected by conflict. JRP promotes sustainable peace through the active involvement of war-affected communities in research and advocacy.

Justice in north needs complex solutions, Daily Monitor, 29 Jan 2012

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Justice in north needs complex solutions, Daily Monitor, 29 Jan 2012
http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/ThoughtIdeas/-/689844/1315470/-/item/0/-/9le52p/-/index.html

By Lino Owor Ogora

In July last year, Thomas Kwoyelo became the first Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander to be charged before Uganda’s International Crimes Division (ICD). He was charged with 53 counts crimes against humanity. On September 22, a few months after the commencement of his trial, Uganda’s Constitutional Court ruled that Kwoyelo was entitled to amnesty in line with Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000, and ordered his trial to be halted forthwith, a ruling which was further upheld by the High Court on January 25, 2012.

This court ruling has attracted mixed reactions from national and international actors and the public at large. While some people have applauded the court ruling and amnesty alike, others condemned both.

The case of Kwoyelo, however, re-affirms the fact that the pursuit of justice in northern Uganda requires complex solutions beyond merely dragging ex-commanders of the LRA to the courts of law.

In this regard, it is vital to understand the significance of amnesty in stemming the conflict in northern Uganda, and the complications that come with handling individuals who carry dual victim-perpetrator identities.

Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000 offers pardon to ‘any Ugandan who has at any time since January 26, 1986, engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda’. In northern Uganda, amnesty has been instrumental in fostering the return of thousands of ex-combatants. Until August 22, 2008, the Amnesty Commission’s database indicated 22,930 reporters – 50 per cent of these were LRA reporters.

Success in the air
This is an indication that amnesty has registered a tremendous success. If it were not for amnesty, millions of people would still be living within IDP camps. Thousands more children would have been abducted, and even the Juba peace talks which ushered in the prevailing peace in northern Uganda would not have taken place.

Many critics of amnesty may argue that the amnesty law in northern Uganda is no longer relevant given that the LRA have been subdued. However, if you lived in northern Uganda during the period of the insurgency, or even simply visited an IDP camp at the height of the conflict and witnessed the suffering of the people, you would understand and appreciate the prioritisation of ‘peace first, justice later’ and amnesty. It is because of this prioritisation that northern Ugandans, led by religious and traditional leaders were at the forefront of advocating for amnesty as a crucial factor in ending the conflict.

With the LRA still very much alive and committing atrocities in Central African Republic and Southern Sudan, the amnesty law is still needed. In a situational survey conducted by the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) in December 2011 in Acholi region, more than 90 per cent of the respondents believed that amnesty was still relevant. Therefore, rather than argue for the total nullification of the amnesty law, perhaps the question we need to answer is whether amendments are required to specify clearly which commanders of the LRA should or should not be granted amnesty in the event that they return.

In addition, the case of Kwoyelo also raises complex questions regarding the perpetrators who are victims themselves. Kwoyelo was abducted at the age of 15 from his village of Pogo in Pabo Sub-County in Amuru District. Like other children and youth before him, he was carried off into captivity, trained into a child soldier and rose through the ranks to become a high ranking commander. The fate of adult commanders of the LRA who were abducted as children and turned into the killers they are today has been a topic of substantial discussion.

Having been abducted while young and vulnerable, Kwoyelo was a victim. Having committed crimes after the age of 18, Kwoyelo should be able to take responsibility for his actions. What then should be the fate of such individuals? Many human rights activists have often flatly insisted that on becoming adults, such individuals need to take full responsibility for their actions. Why is it that such human rights activists never talk of holding the government accountable for failing to protect children such as Kwoyelo from abduction in the first place? There is need to consider all these circumstances when dealing with cases such as Kwoyelo’s.

Furthermore, there is need to reflect on why cases of NRA/UPDF perpetrators who committed war crimes during the insurgency are not coming up. In northern Uganda, it is a known fact that all armed parties to the conflict, including state and non-state actors, committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Court martials not good enough?
While the Juba Peace Agreement calls for handling state actors through other measures such as military court martials, many people in northern Uganda feel the outcomes of these courts would be highly unpredictable, and could lead to many state actor perpetrators being let off the hook.

Military court martial proceedings are often closed to the public and conducted by the army leadership and the participation of victims is often limited. For these reasons, many people in northern Uganda will continue reiterating their call for prosecution of state actors within the ICD. If charges are not brought against the UPDF, or at the very least investigations into state violations conducted, then DPP, runs the risk of being labeled partial.

Finally, beyond pursuing justice in courts of law, there is need to keep the needs of victims and survivors of the conflict in mind. Victims need reparations, compensation, restitution, and restoration of their livelihoods.

Beyond passing guilty or non-guilty verdicts, courts of law such as the ICD will not cater for these very important needs. For reparations to be effected in a proper and timely manner, Uganda requires a reparations policy, which is currently lacking. All these factors should be taken into consideration for justice to prevail in Northern Uganda.

The author is a researcher with the Justice & Reconciliation Project, an NGO based in Gulu District.

http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/ThoughtIdeas/-/689844/1315470/-/item/0/-/9le52p/-/index.html

“Justice and Reconciliation Project reports on Acholi perceptions of the Amnesty Act,” Resolve Blog, 9 Jan 2012

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“Justice and Reconciliation Project reports on Acholi perceptions of the Amnesty Act,” Resolve Blog, 9 Jan 2012 
http://www.theresolve.org/blog/archives/3071031799

 

By Azy

We’re fans of the folks at The Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) — they’re great people doing great work. Recently, JRP released an interesting report that focuses on the feelings and perceptions of LRA-affected communities in northern Uganda toward Uganda’s Amnesty Act.

The Uganda Amnesty Act of 2000 grants amnesty to any rebel combatant from 1986 onward who lays down his or her weapons and renounces the rebellion. According to JRP’s report, more than 10,800 former members of the LRA have received amnesty through the Act as of August 2008, and have re-joined their communities with less harassment and stigma than they otherwise would have experienced without this national policy of forgiveness. The Amnesty Act has been shown to actively encourage combatants to defect from the LRA, with the promise that they will be accepted back home. This is very important, as so many LRA combatants were abducted as children and were unwilling combatants in the first place.

As reflected in the report, JRP researchers interviewed a spectrum of Acholi community members, from local leaders to former-abductees, and asked what they thought of amnesty. Their findings show overwhelming support for the Amnesty Act and many respondents argued that Uganda’s amnesty policy is partially to thank for the peace that the region has experienced since the LRA left Uganda’s borders in 2006. It helps clean the slate and faciliate forgiveness for the unwilling fighters, from both their community and their country.

Interestingly, some of the respondents said they wished that even the top commanders would be granted amnesty, arguing that almost everyone aside from LRA leader Joseph Kony was at one time a victim.

Currently, the Amnesty Act of 2000 is due to either expire or be extended in May 2012, making JRP’s report especially timely.

In this same vein, this spring Resolve will be lobbying our leaders in Washington with the recommendation that part of the $10 million in foreign aid Congress recently authorized for the LRA-affected communities should go towards the rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration of LRA combatants.

In the case of the LRA, amnesty is an important component of peace and restoration that must go hand-in-hand with focused efforts to support ex-combatants as they seek healing and reintegrate with their communities.

This report is just 3 pages long and fascinating from beginning to end. Take a few minutes to read it yourself.

“Kwoyelo Amnesty Raises Questions about Ugandan Justice,” International Justice Resource Center, 30 Nov. 2011

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“Kwoyelo Amnesty Raises Questions about Ugandan Justice,” International Justice Resource Center, 30 Nov. 2011
http://ihrlaw.org/2011/11/30/kwoyelo-amnesty-raises-questions-about-ugandan-justice/

In Uganda, amnesty for an alleged Lord’s Resistance Army commander, Thomas Kwoyelo, by the country’s High Court has raised questions regarding the future of transitional justice there.  Kwoyelo had been the first person charged by the International Crimes Division of the High Court for murder and other acts allegedly committed during nearly two decades of attacks by LRA forces on civilians in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (detailed background here).  Although the grant of amnesty was upheld on appeal, the attorney general has appealed again to the Supreme Court.  Many LRA rebels were granted amnesty under the Amnesty Act of 2000, but Kwoyelo had been denied without explanation when he applied. [Sunday Monitor; BBC; RNW]  Other LRA leaders indicted by the International Criminal Court have yet to be captured (Kwoyelo is not sought by the ICC). [ICC]

Kwoyelo’s trial on charges of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions began in July 2011 (see HRW report here).  As reported by Human Rights Watch:

Kwoyelo’s defense counsel signalled to the court that they would raise three preliminary objections to the trial. One would be in regard to the state’s failure to apply Uganda’s Amnesty Law to Kwoyelo, although thousands of other LRA combatants have been granted amnesty under the act. The second would be to the fact that they had yet to receive full disclosure of the prosecution file, including exculpatory evidence. The third would be to the application of the Geneva Conventions Act to Kwoyelo’s alleged conduct.

[HRW] The International Crimes Division then sought an interpretation of these issues by the appellate court, which ruled on September 22 that Kwoyelo was entitled to amnesty under the law and as a matter of equal protection.  When the prosecution sought a stay of the order to release him, on November 10, the appeals court confirmed its September ruling  and held Kwoyelo should be freed.  Recently, when Kwoyelo remained in custody despite the court’s order, the International Crime Division of the High Court urged the public prosecutor to apply the amnesty and set him free. [AllAfrica; Justice and Reconciliation; Yahoo;  Insight on Conflict]

As reported by the Justice and Reconciliation Project, residents in Kwoyelo’s hometown in northern Uganda who identify Kwoyelo “as the face of the LRA” blamed him for the atrocities committed there and “feel strongly that he should not return and fear his presence in the area.”  Further, the Project reports, “victims expressed frustration over inconsistent dealings with the ICD and a lack of communication about current developments in Kwoyelo’s case”. [JRP]

“Col. Kwoyelo rearrested within minutes of his release by High Court in Gulu,” Acholi Times, 14 Nov. 2011

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“Col. Kwoyelo rearrested within minutes of his release by High Court in Gulu,” Acholi Times, 14 Nov. 2011
http://www.acholitimes.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=511%3Acol-kwoyelo-rearrested-within-minutes-of-his-release-by-high-court-in-gulu&catid=8%3Afront-news&Itemid=95

By Livingstone David Okumu

Uncertainty swept through the courtroom in Gulu High Court on Friday after former LRA Colonel Thomas Kwoyelo was whisked away under tight security to Gulu prison minutes after the International Crimes Division directed that he be set freed immediately. Col Kwoyelo, who was facing 53 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, was officially set free at 11:30 am after a 2 hour delay on Friday 11 November 2011.

The head of the court, Justice Dan Akiiki Kiiza after a brief apology to the court over the delay in convening the court said that they were simply following a directive from the Constitutional Court after its ruling on the 22nd September.

The Constitutional Court had ruled that the denial of Col Kwoyelo’s application for amnesty by the DPP was unconstitutional and contradicted articles 1, 2, 20 and 21 of the constitution of Uganda.

Justice Akiiki said the court in releasing Col Kwoyelo was simply following the directive of a higher authority.

“We hereby cease the trial of the accused Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni forthwith. And consequently direct the DPP and the Amnesty Commission to comply with the provisions of the amnesty act” he ordered before ending the session.

The court room burst into a murmur of approval as Kwoyelo, wearing matching green shirt and trousers, was directed by prison warders, into the back of the court.

However, the crowd, including his mother and sisters, who attended the session waited for more than 45 minutes in the hope of seeing Col Kwoyelo released, only to see him whisked away in two prison pickup trucks led by a police escort truck.

His mother, Rosolina Oyela said she was surprised by the incident because she expected to go back home with her son.

His lawyer, Francis Onyango declined to comment on the matter.

“I have no comment because there is a Supreme Court case over the issue,” he said.

Civil society, cultural and religious leaders in the region reiterated their called for the promotion of Mato Oput way of justice to the war affected communities in northern Uganda. Lino Owor Ogora, the head of research and documentation at the Justice and Reconciliation Project, said the way forward is to reconcile Kwoyelo with the victims in Pabbo.

He said technically Kwoyelo is free but realistically he is not since a needed to be face the communities of his victims to ensure that he leads a normal life in their midst.

Kwoyelo was whisked to Kampala after a brief stay a Gulu prisons.

“State ignores court ruling over Kwoyelo,” Daily Monitor, 13 Nov. 2011

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“State ignores court ruling over Kwoyelo,” Daily Monitor, 13 Nov. 2011
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1271924/-/bgurw8z/-/

By Moses Akena and David Livingstone Okuuu

Former Lord’s Resistance Army commander Thomas Kwoyelo was on Friday whisked off to prison despite a ruling by the International Crimes Division of the High Court set ting him free.

Justice Dan Akiiki Kiiza ordered for the release of Kwoyelo following an order by the Constitutional Court.

“We hereby ceased the trial of the accused person (Kwoyelo) alias Latoni forthwith. And consequently we hereby direct the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the Amnesty Commission to comply with the provisions of the Amnesty Act,” said Judge Akiiki.

Mr Frank Mayanja Baine, the Prisons spokesperson, last evening confirmed the continued detention of Kwoyelo, saying he is still facing two other charges.

“We work on documents and for someone to be released on amnesty, he or she must have a certificate, which Kwoyelo has not got, to be released. Once he gets the certificate and other documents for his release then we shall release him,” he said in a telephone interview.

Kwoyelo’s mother, Ms Rosolina Oyela, said she was surprised by the incident because she expected to go back home with her son.

His lawyer Francis Onyango, however, declined to comment on the matter. “I have no comment because there is a Supreme Court case over the issue,” he said.

Civil society want reconciliation
The court, however, did not mention the Supreme Court appeal.

Civil society actors in the region reiterated their call for reparations to war affected communities in northern Uganda, and reconciliation.

Mr Lino Owor Ogora, the head of research and documentation at the Justice and Reconciliation Project, said the way forward is to reconcile Kwoyelo with the victims in Pabbo.

Kwoyelo is the first LRA commander to be prosecuted for crimes committed during the two-decade war in northern Uganda that left thousand dead and millions displaced. He was captured in 2008 during Operation Lightning Thunder in Garamba Forest, eastern DR Congo.

The ICC in 2005 issued an arrest warrant for five top LRA commanders, including their leader Joseph Kony, Dominic Ogweng, Onen Kamdul and two others who died in the bush. Kony is said to be operating between Central African Republic and Sudan.

“US Troop Deployment Revisited – The Hunt for Kony,” Justice in Conflict blog, 3 Nov. 2011

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“US Troop Deployment Revisited – The Hunt for Kony,” Justice in Conflict blog, 3 Nov. 2011
http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/11/03/us-troop-deployment-revisited-%E2%80%93-the-hunt-for-kony/

By Patrick Wegner

US President Barack Obama’s decision to send 100 combat armed military advisors to Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan made worldwide headlines about three weeks ago. The controversial decision and discussions about its consequences brought the LRA conflict back into the headlines after the world had all but forgotten about the steady trickle of mutilations, killings and abductions mainly committed in the DRC and CAR by the LRA. One thing has become very clear to me in interviews with diplomats and staff of international organizations that are working in the context of the conflict: the LRA is no longer seen as a threat for regional stability. This means that the LRA conflict has ceased to matter in the big picture of geopolitics. It is another one of those low intensity conflicts that claim the lives of innocent civilians on a daily basis but are not endangering the security interests of powerful nations. What does the US troop deployment mean in this context?

Since foreign policy practitioners do not see the conflict as a risk to regional stability, President Obama’s move could be regarded as a surprise. Yet, it makes perfect sense both in a US domestic as well as in an international perspective. The US has seen constant campaigning by civil society organizations like Enough and Invisible Children who pressure the US administration to do something about the deaths of innocent civilians in Central Africa. The campaigning led to the signing of the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act by Barack Obama in May 2010. A high ranking diplomat I talked to a couple of weeks before the troop deployment told me that he expects the US to ‘do something’ in the LRA context soon, as a Congress report on the LRA Act was upcoming in late October and the administration needed to be seen doing something. His prediction proved right.

From the international perspective, Uganda is of high strategic importance in the region. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) is one of the strongest armies in the area. It plays a major role in the UN Mission in Somalia, provides staff for UNAMID in Darfur, and plays the leading role in regional efforts to hunt down the LRA. The fact that the UPDF is providing troops for these missions removes pressure from Western nations to deploy their own troops in the region. Finally, the recent discovery of oil has just increased Uganda’s importance. The decision can therefore also be seen as an acknowledgement of the important role Uganda is playing in the region.Many Ugandans I talked to are deeply distrustful of the US intervention. Most people think that the US is showing up now, years after the war ended in northern Uganda, because oil has been discovered in Amuru. Yet, the LRA is no longer a Ugandan issue. The LRA has spread over three states in the region, and people are still dying. So there are valid arguments for intervening on humanitarian grounds. But what is the impact of the deployment we can expect on the ground? Critics like Lindsay McCain of the Justice and Reconciliation Project from northern Uganda say that the deployment of US military advisors will reinforce the military logic of the conflict and lead to the death of innocent abducted children that travel with the LRA. She criticises the lack of a humanitarian component and a focus on protecting civilians in the affected regions from LRA attacks. I think those arguments are valid and point out a significant weakness of the US approach to combating the LRA. Yet, the deployment of US advisors might still help to stop the conflict and end the suffering of civilians in the longer term.

The US has been supporting the UPDF for several years. In the beginning, this support was mainly given through financial aid for the military budget. During Operation Lightning Thunder, that marked the end of negotiation efforts during the Juba Peace Process and was meant to ‘wipe out’ the LRA, US military advisors provided the UPDF with information and advice. Still the operation failed. Afterwards, the US supported the hunt for Kony and the remaining LRA rebels through providing the UPDF with GPS data and satellite imagery. Yet, the UPDF was not sufficiently equipped to act on that information. On the one hand, they had no means to use the exact GPS data the US provided them with, on the other hand the UPDF rapid response capacities were insufficient to hunt down the LRA fast enough.

The deployment of US military advisors on the ground who can help the UPDF to make use of the data forwarded by US military intelligence could make a real difference. The UPDF has been close to capturing or killing Kony at least twice in recent years. In August 2009, the UPDF ran into Joseph Kony’s bodyguards in CAR and killed several of them in the ensuing gunfight, yet Kony managed to escape while being chased by the UPDF.

In October 2011 the UPDF again ran into Kony’s entourage according to the UPDF spokesman. Kony moves inside several circles of security perimeters. Three rings of bodyguards move constantly with him, and as soon as the outer ring engages in combat, Kony has the opportunity to quickly flee into the opposite direction. But chances are that Kony will eventually run out of luck if the UPDF is able to track his group more closely with the help of US military advisors.

We might well see the end of Joseph Kony’s flight soon. Whether this would mean the end of the conflict is not clear though. The LRA has splintered into ever smaller groups and it is not clear in how far Kony still has full control of them. Independent LRA groups may be roaming through CAR and DRC abducting and killing civilians for years after Kony’s death or capture. Additionally, UN sources have told me that many armed groups and militias in the DRC have started mimicking LRA attacks to cover up their robberies. It is hard to say how much of the ‘LRA activity’ we see in the region is actually local banditry.

Finally, on an interesting side note, a former top LRA Commander I was able to talk to told me that Joseph Kony had announced as early as 1998 that his spirits had revealed to him that Ugandans would bring in the US to hunt him. Kony made a prophecy that the war would end when the US becomes involved. They would not be able to catch him, but would help the Acholi of northern Uganda to recover from the war. Kony said that his spirits revealed to him that he would just disappear in the jungle, ‘like Moses disappeared after leading his people to the Holy Land’. The spirits told him that the US would come to search for him, only to eventually find out that he had disappeared without a trace for ever.

‘I cannot accept what I have not done’: Storytelling, Gender and Transitional Justice, Journal of Human Rights Practice, 4 Nov. 2011

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‘I cannot accept what I have not done’: Storytelling, Gender and Transitional Justice, Journal of Human Rights Practice, 4 Nov. 2011

http://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/11/04/jhuman.hur015.full#xref-ref-30-1

By Erin Baines and Beth Stewart

Note: JRP’s Gender Justice department assisted in this research.

Abstract

Storytelling can be a process of seeking social equilibrium after violence. We examine this proposition through the stories of Ajok, an Acholi woman who was abducted by the rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda and who was forced into marriage and motherhood. We consider how her stories contest discrimination by her neighbours and family since her return, creatively reinterpreting the past to defend her innocence and moral character

throughout the war and to defend her rightful place in present society as an Acholi woman and mother. The article concludes by reflecting on the value of locally based and culturally relevant storytelling for survivors in the field and practice of transitional justice.

To read the full article, click here